Xiaoxu Meng

• By Eva Tardos
• Repeated games
  • player’s value/cost additive over periods, while playing
  • players try to learn what is the best from past data
  • what can we say about the outcome? how long do they have to stay to ensure OK social welfare?
• Result: routing, limit for very small users
  • Theorem:
    • In any network with continuous, non-decreasing cost functions and small users
    • cost of Nash with rates ri for all i <= cost of opt with rate 2ri for all i
  • Nash equilibrium: stable solution where no player had incentive to deviate.
  • Price of Anarchy = cost of worst Nash equilibrium / social optimum cost;
• Examples of price of anarchy bounds
• Price of anarchy in auctions
  • First price is auction
  • All pay auction…
  • Other applications include:
    • public goods
    • fair sharing
    • Walrasian Mechanism
• Repeated game that is slowly changing
  • Dynamic population model
    • at each step t each player I is replaced with an arbitrary new player with probability p
    • in a population of N players, each step, Np players replaced in expectation
    • population changes all the time: need to adjust
    • players stay long enough…
• Learning in repeated game
  • what is learning?
  • Does learning lead to finding Nash equilibrium?
  • fictitious play = best respond to past history of other players goal: “pre-play” as a way to learn to play Nash
• Find a better idea when the game is playing?
  • Change of focus: outcome of learning in playing
• Nash equilibrium of the one shot game?
  • Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game: stable actions a with no regret for any alternate strategy x.
  • cost_i(x, a_-i) >= cost_i(a)
• Behavior is far from stable
• no regret without stability: learning
  • no regret: for any fixed action x (cost \in [0,1]):
    • sum_t(cost_i(a^t)) <= sum_t(cost_i(x, a_-i^t)) + error
    • error <= √T (if o(T) called no-regret)
• Outcome of no-regret learning in a fixed game
  • limit distribution sigma of play (action vectors a = (a1, a2,…,an))
• No regret leanring as a behavior model:
  •  Pro:
    • no need for common prior or rationality assumption on opponents
    • behavioral assumption: if there is a consistently good strategy: please notice!
    • algorithm: many simple rules ensure regret approx.
    • Behavior model ….
• Distribution of smallest rationalizable multiplicative regret
  • strictly positive regret: learning phase maybe better than no-regret
• Today (with d options):
  • sum_t(cost_i(a^t)) <= sum_t(cost_i(x, a_-i^t)) + √Tlogd
  • sum_t(cost_i(a^t)) <= (1 + epsilon)sum_t(cost_i(x, a_-i^t)) + log(d)/epsilon
• Quality of learning outcome
• Proof technique: Smoothness
• Learning and price of anarchy
• Learning in dynamic games
  • Dynamic population model
    • at each step t each player I is replaced with an arbitrary new player with probability p
  • how should they learn from data?
• Need for adaptive learning
• Adapting result to dynamic populations
  • inequality we wish to have
• Change in optimum solution
• Use differential privacy -> stable solution

STACKGAN: generate image from text

point cloud -> deep network -> classification / segmentation / super-resolution

traditional classification / segmentation:

projection onto 2D plane and use 2D classification / segmentation

unordered set

point(Vec3) -> feature vector (Vec5) -> normalize (end with the bound of the pointcloud)

N points:

segmentation:

feature from N points ->NxK classes of each point (each point will have a class)

classification:

feature from N points -> K x 1 vector (K classes)